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TAKING WITHOUT COMPENSATION THROUGH
COMPULSORY DEDICATION-NEW HORIZONS
FOR CALIFORNIA LAND USE LAW:
ASSOCIATED HOME BUILDERS v. CITY OF
WALNUT CREEK1
The continuing depletion of recreational open space in California
and the financial inability of municipalities to provide such open space
for the public prompted the legislature in 1965 to enact section 11546
of the Business and Professions Code.2 This statutes authorized Cali-
1. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, -
U.S. -, 92 S. Ct. 202 (1971).
2. CAL.. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 11546 (West Supp. 1971). In enacting this
statute, the legislature declared that its intent was to implement the recommendations of
the Final Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Municipal and County Gov-
ernment to the 1965 Regular Session of the Legislature.
In its Final Report, the Assembly Committee on Municipal and County Government
found that increased population had created the need for more neighborhood recrea-
tional space but that methods for acquiring such space then available to local govern-
ments all involved substantial increases in bonded debt or property tax burdens.
The "preferred" method-that of assessing the subdivider fees or requiring dedi-
cation of land as a condition to subdivision approval-might be illegal absent a
proper state enabling statute tying the exactions to the benefit of the subdivision resi-
dents affected. Such enabling legislation was recommended. 6 ASSEMBLY INTnRIM
COMM. REPORTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON MUNICIPAL
AND CoUNTY Gov'T 31, ch. 1809, § 3 [1965] Cal. Stat. 4183.
3. The governing body of a city or county may by ordinance require the dedication
of land, the payment of fees in lieu thereof, or a combination of both, for park or
recreational purposes as a condition to the approval of a final subdivision map, pro-
vided that:
(a) The ordinance has been in effect for a period of 30 days prior to the filing of
the tentative map of the subdivision.
(b) The ordinance includes definite standards for determining the proportion of a
subdivision to be dedicated and the amount of any fee to be paid in lieu
thereof.
(c) The land, fees, or combination thereof are to be used only for the purpose of
providing park or recreational facilities to serve the subdivision.
(d) The legislative body has adopted a general plan containing a recreational
element, and the park and recreational facilities are in accordance with defi-
nite principles and standards contained therein.
(e) The amount and location of land to be dedicated or the fees to be paid
shall bear a reasonable relationship to the use of the park and recreational
facilities by the future inhabitants of the subdivision.
(f) The city or county must specify when development of the park or recrea-
tional facilities will begin.
(g) Only the payment of fees may be required in subdivisions containing fifty
(50) parcels or less.
The provisions of this section do not apply to industrial subdivisions.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 11546 (West Supp. 1971).
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fornia cities and counties to enact ordinances requiring subdividers to
dedicate land, or to pay fees in lieu thereof, for park and recreational
purposes as a condition to the approval of a final subdivision map.4
In upholding the constitutionality of section 11546 against claims, inter
alia, that it authorized "takings" of property without payment of just
compensation, the California Supreme Court, in Associated Home
Builders v. City of Walnut Creek,5 has served notice of its intention to
expand the state's police power into areas traditionally reserved only for
the exercise of eminent domain, and has further clouded an already
confused area of the law.
The immediate catalyst to this action was the enactment by the City
of Walnut Creek, pursuant to the authority granted it by the California
legislature, of Municipal Code Section 10-1.516.0 This section pro-
vides that if land designated in the City's general plan as park or rec-
reational space falls within a proposed subdivision, an amount of
such land must be dedicated to public recreational use. The amount
of land to be dedicated depends upon the type of residence built and the
number of future residents of the proposed subdivision.7 A resolution
setting forth the specific formula to be used provides that two and one-
half acres are to be dedicated for each 1,000 new residents. Further-
more, if no park or recreational space is designated on the City's gen-
eral plan and the proposed subdivision is within three-fourths of a mile of
an existing or planned park, or if no dedication is feasible, the subdi-
vider must pay a fee equal to the value of the land he would have had
to dedicate under the above formula.8
Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc.9 sought de-
claratory relief claiming principally that the state statute and the city
4. Id. See Subdivision Map Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. §§ 11500-11629
(West 1964 and Supp. 1971). The Subdivision Map Act is the enabling statute pro-
viding for the supervision of subdivisions by local California governments. Section
11525 requires that every county and city adopt an ordinance regulating and controlling
the design and improvement of subdivisions. Under section 11610 the subdivider may
file a final map of his subdivision for approval by the proper local government.
Section 11567 describes the form and contents of the final map. It must show all
lots, blocks, and streets within the subdivision as well as all survey data necessary to
specify its location.
5. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
6. Id. at 636, 484 P.2d at 609, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. [hereinafter referred to
as Associated] is a non-profit corporation organized to promote the home-building
industry. 4 Cal. 3d at 635 n.1, 484 P.2d at 608 n.1, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 632 n.1.
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ordinance were unconstitutional as violative of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and California Constitutions in
that they deprived the subdivider of his property without compensa-
tion.'
0
A unanimous California Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Mosk, held the compulsory exactions of the statute and ordinance to be
constitutional, implicitly finding a valid exercise of the police power."
10. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. ... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The California Constitution's due process clause is nearly identical. It provides:
"[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law ...... CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13, cl. 6. Additionally, the California Constitution
provides: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation having first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner,.
CAL. CNST. art. I, § 14.
The Fourteenth Amendment contains no "just compensation" provision (as does the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause). However, the Fourteenth Amendment has
been interpreted as imposing this requirement upon the states. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.
v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[N]or [shall
any State] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The California Constitution requires that "all laws of
a general nature shall have a uniform operation," and that "no special privileges or
immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the
Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immuni-
ties which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." CAL. CONST.
art. I, §§ 11 and 21. The California Supreme Court has held that "the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and sections 11 and 21 of article I of the
California Constitution, provide generally equivalent but independent protections in
their respective jurisdictions." Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d
586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965).
11. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 648, 484 P.2d 606, 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 642 (1971). While
this Note will principally concern itself with Associated's claim that its property was
unconstitutionally taken without just compensation, it must be noted that Associated
advanced various other contentions attacking the validity of sections 11546 (note 3
supra) and 10-1.516 (text accompanying note 6 supra), all of which were easily dis-
posed of by the court. First, Associated argued that section 11546 imposed a "double
tax" upon new subdivision residents and that it constituted a special assessment
against the future subdivision property owners without a right of hearing or protest.
See note 155 infra. Second, Associated argued that section 11546 favored, for
example, apartment developers building on unsubdivided land, and that it prejudiced
the high-density subdivider in favor of the low density subdivider. See text accom-
panying notes 169-71 and 177-92 infra. Third, Associated contended that a city might
set dedication requirements or in-lieu fees so high as to purposely exclude low-income
groups from the community. See text accompanying notes 172-76 infra. Fourth,
Associated contended that recreational facilities did not bear a sufficient relationship to
the health and welfare of the subdivision residents to warrant a taking under the police
power. The court summarily rejected this contention, noting that no court had ever
distinguished between the traditionally approved exactions (sewers, streets, drainage fa-
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The court expressly rejected Associated's contention that the legisla-
tion allows a taking of property without compensation. 12  From this
holding, the reasonable deduction follows that if the state is not
"taking" under its power of eminent domain, it must be "regulating"
under its police power." As such, no compensation is required.
14
However, the court failed to discuss the difficult issue of how to dis-
tinguish, both theoretically and practically, between an exercise of emi-
cilities et al.) and recreational facilities. 4 Cal. 3d at 641, 484 P.2d at 612, 94 Cal.
Rptr. at 636. Fifth, Associated specifically attacked the constitutionality of section
11546(f), which allows a city or county to say when development of park facilities will
begin. The court noted that the guidelines provided by Walnut Creek's resolution 2225
were sufficiently precise to meet constitutional standards and could not evidence an ar-
bitrary delegation of power to a local government. Id. at 643, 484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal.
Rptr. at 638. Sixth, Associated attacked the constitutionality of section 11546(g) in
that it provided for the payment of fees by those who subdivided into 50 parcels or less
while those who subdivided into more than 50 parcels would have to dedicate their land.
The court rejected this contention, finding no discrimination in the fact that one person
must pay in land while another must pay in cash. Id. at 643 n.11, 484 P.2d at
614 n.11, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638 n.11. Seventh, Associated contended that the standard
of fair market value and the broad discretion afforded the city to determine the
feasibility of dedication were too indefinite and arbitrary to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. In rejecting this contention, the court noted that "fair market value" is a
commonly litigated term and is as precise as possible, and that resolution 2225 pro-
vides adequate standards. Id. at 645, 484 P.2d at 616, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640. Eighth,
the court rejected Associated's contention that the broad discretion afforded the city to
determine when and to whom credit may be given for voluntarily provided land was
arbitrary, holding that broad discretion must exist in order to assure conformance of
the proposed facility with the master plan. Id. at 646, 484 P.2d at 616, 94 Cal. Rptr.
at 640. Ninth, the court held that the city's general plan contains a sufficiently de-
tailed set of principles and standards so as to comply with the requirements of section
11546(d). Id. at 647, 484 P.2d at 617, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 641. Tenth, Associated
contended that since section 11546(b) requires that an ordinance set forth the stand-
ards controlling the amojint of land to be dedicated or fees to be paid, Walnut
Creek's ordinance 10-1.516 is infirm because it allows the standards to be set forth
only by resolution. The court, however, determined that a resolution will suffice if
passed in the manner and with the statutory formality required in the enactment of an
ordinance. Id., 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642, citing Central Mfg. Dist., Inc. v.
Board of Supervisors, 176 Cal. App. 2d 850, 860, 1 Cal. Rptr. 733, 739 (1960). Since
the record failed to indicate the circumstances under which the resolution was
adopted, the court presumed its validity. 4 Cal. 3d at 647, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal.
Rptr. at 642.
12. Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
13. The court nowhere expressly stated that it found the exactions imposed by
Business and Professions Code § 11546 to be valid under the state's police power.
It does, however, cite approvingly a number of out-of-state cases where similar exac-
tions have been upheld under the police power. 4 Cal. 3d at 644-45, 484 P.2d at 615,
94 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
14. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 593-94
(1906); Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 49, 207 P.2d 1, 11
(1949) (Carter, J., dissenting opinion).
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nent domain and an exercise of police power. A discussion of this is-
sue is crucial to an understanding of the controversy involved in the
case.
Generally, the police power is the power to regulate reasonably the
use of property for the good of public health, safety, morals or gen-
eral welfare, while the eminent domain power governs the taking of
property for a public use and for which just compensation must be
paid.
1"
Eminent domain has been defined as "the power of the sovereign to
take property for public use without the owner's consent.""' Though
just compensation is not an essential element of the meaning of eminent
domain, it is so crucial to the valid exercise of the power that courts
have incorporated this limitation into the meaning of the term.17 The
power of eminent domain, like that of the police power, is inherent in
the concept of sovereignty."" While its source is not constitutional, the
power of eminent domain is limited by both the Federal and State Con-
stitutions and by statute. The Fifth" and Fourteenth Amendments and
Article I, section 14 of the California Constitution require that private
property be taken only for a "public use" and, if acquired, that "just
compensation" be paid to the owner.20  Section 1241 of the Califor-
na Code of Civil Procedure requires that the proposed public use be
an authorized one and that the property sought to be condemned be
necessary for the public use proposed. 2' The term "public use" is gen-
erally applied in the sense of "general welfare" or "public good".22
To that extent the statute seems merely to reiterate requirements implicit
in the Federal and State Constitutions. However, the requirements of
section 1241 emphasize the importance of the concept of public neces-
sity to the definition of eminent domain.23
It has been stated that it is impossible to afford the term "police
15. 11 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.04 (3d ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as McQUILLIN].
16. P. NICHOLS, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMMN § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1964) (herein-
after cited as NICHOLS].
17. Id.
18. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1875); People ex rel. Dept. of
Public Works v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304, 340 P.2d 598, 601 (1959).
19. "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property, be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. See note 10 supra.
21. CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1241 (West 1967).
22. NICHOLS, supra note 16, at § 1.11.
23. Id. § 1.41[1].
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power" a "concise and accurate" definition.24 Attempts to do so have
produced such results as: "the power of the sovereign to prevent per-
sons under its jurisdiction from conducting themselves or using their
property to the detriment of the general welfare," 25 or
the power of the sovereign to legislate in behalf of the public health,
morals, or safety by general regulations reasonably adapted to the end
in view and not creating any arbitrary discrimination between differ-
ent classes of men or things.
26
The line between taking and regulation is hazy at best and the United
States Supreme Court, in recent years at least, has been reluctant to de-
lineate specific criteria with which to distinguish the two concepts.27
Earlier cases, however, saw the development of two theories which at-
tempted to clarify the terms. The first was developed in the late 19th
century and may be termed the "physical acquisition test."'28  This test
apparently rests upon a literal interpretation of the word "taking." Un-
less there is a physical invasion29 or appropriation 0 of private prop-
erty by the government, no taking results and therefore no compensa-
tion to the owner is required. This test emerged, however, when the
scope of governmental regulation was limited to the control of "noxious
uses" of property, and the distinction between physical appropriations
and simple regulation was easy to draw.3
24. Id. § 1.42.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962).
28. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (using the term "physical
invasion" and "practical ouster"). See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 67-69 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
29. An example of a physical invasion amounting to a taking is provided in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872). There the plain-
tiff's land was rendered useless by its flooding resulting from the State's construction of
a dam. The Pumpelly holding was discussed in Transportation Co. v. Chicago,
99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) and restated as follows:
[iMt was held [in Pumpelly] that permanent flooding of private property may be
regarded as a "taking". . . . I]here was a physical invasion of the real estate of
the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession. But in the present case
[where the plaintiffs were temporarily denied access to their business by the city's
construction work] there was no such invasion. No entry was made upon the
plaintiffs' lot.
Thus, under the "physical acquisition" test, the state need not hold fee title to the
property in question. If it asserts proprietary control over the property the state will be
deemed to have "taken" it. See Sax, supra note 28, at 39, n.15.
30. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887), the court found no ap-
propriation where the "legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of
his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it. . . ."
31. The abatement of "noxious uses" was not the taking of property because uses
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In the early 20th century, as government regulation grew more in-
tense, it became clear that substantial property interests could be af-
fected by what earlier courts would have called regulation.32  Justice
Holmes' response to this spectre of increased regulation may be termed
the "degree test."' 33 Under this test, there is no qualitative difference
between taking and regulation as in the physical acquisition test, but
rather there exists "a continuum in which established property interests
[are] asked to yield more or less to the pressures of public demands.
's4
The economic harm caused the property owner is balanced against pub-
lic necessity.3" Should the regulation go too far it is deemed a taking,
and the once clear distinction between regulation and taking thus be-
comes one of degree. 36  In order for the regulation to be a valid exer-
cise of the police power, it must be reasonable.8"
Although the two tests rest on conceptually different grounds, both
have been cited approvingly by the United States Supreme Court.8 s
contrary to the public interest were not considered property. Gardner v. Michigan,
199 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1905). See also Sax, supra note 28, at 38-9.
For examples of such simple regulations to abate noxious uses of property see L'Hote
v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900) (regulation of prostitution upheld); Fertilizing
Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (ordinance abating offensive fertilizer factory
within city limits a valid exercise of police power).
For examples of physical appropriations see notes 29 and 30 supra and cases cited
therein.
32. Sax, supra note 28, at 40-41.
33. See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922); accord, Mid-Way
Cabinet etc. Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 187, 65 Cal. Rptr.
37, 41 (1967); cf. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 663, 137 P. 1119,
1127 (1913).
34. Sax, supra note 28, at 41.
35. Understandably, there was wide variation in the results of such a fluid test.
Some cases seemed to emphasize the economic burden which the "regulation" placed
on the property owner. See, e.g., Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15
(1922); Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). Thus if only a
slight burden was placed on the property owner by the governmental regulation, the
regulation was upheld. See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110
(1911); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Mass., 207 U.S. 79, 86-88 (1907).
Other cases are weighted in favor of the public interest. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915), the Court found the plaintiff's brick making business would
have to yield to the community good, despite substantial financial loss to the plaintiff.
A similar result was reached in Erie R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394,
410 (1921).
36. See cases cited note 33 supra.
37. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962); Pac.
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 662, 137 P. 1119, 1127 (1913).
38. It is difficult to tell where the Court stands today with respect to the two
tests. The Court used the "physical acquisition" test in United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958). There, the United States "regulated" out of
NOTES
The degree test has been used, however, only in a manner supple-
mental to the physical acquisition test. That is, so long as there is a
clear appropriation of property by public authorities for public use, the
physical acquisition test applies and requires that compensation be
paid. 9 But where there is a purported regulation which does not in-
volve an actual taking for government use, or which is so encompass-
ing as to become a virtual taking, the degree test applies.
40
The compulsory dedication cases represent an apparent exception to
the physicial acquisition test. As will be seen, the general pattern of
these cases concerns a property owner who is contemplating a use or
addition to his property which requires him to obtain permission from
some governmental authority, but who is required by that authority, as
a condition precedent to the grant of such permission, to dedicate a por-
tion of his property to the public. Although these cases clearly involve
a physical acquisition of private property by government, courts have
nevertheless considered such acquisitions to be reasonable exercises of
the police power rather than takings of property.4 A variety of com-
pulsory dedications, including new streets,42 street widening,43 water
mains,44 curbs and gutters,41 sidewalks46 and sewers, 47 have been up-
held as valid exercises of the police power. The compulsory dedica-
tion cases have refused (albeit not expressly) to apply the physical
acquisition test, undoubtedly because of the inevitable judicial invalida-
business privately owned gold mines. Yet the Court found no taking because the
government had not occupied, used, or taken physical possession of the mines. Id.
at 165-66.
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), the Court approvingly
cited the "degree" test but declined to state how far regulation could go before it be-
came a taking. Id. at 594.
39. NIcHoLs, supra note 16, at § 1.42[1].
40. Id. § 1.42[1].
41. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1
(1949); Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952). See also, Heyman
and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New
Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE LJ. 1119, 1130 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Heyman & Gilhool].
42. Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
43. Id.
44. Lake Intervale Homes v. Parsippany Township, 43 N.J. Super. 220, 128 A.2d
300 (1956); Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359
(1960).
45. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
46. Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920).
47. Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 228 P.2d 847 (1951); Medine
v. Bums, 29 Misc. 2d 890, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
1972]
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tions which would follow if such a test were used.48 Some courts,
as will be seen, have limited the scope of compulsory dedications to
situations wherein the proposed property use by the owner would itself
create the need for certain public improvements. The exactions are
justified as being reasonable conditions whereby the owner corrects
the burden he has imposed on the community.49
The general approach taken in the compulsory dedication cases is
similar to the degree test approach. The courts, seeking to establish
a standard of reasonableness for the exactions imposed, balance the
public's need against the property owner's detriment. However, as pre-
viously noted, the degree test was used only in those situations where
the physical acquisition test was inappropriate. 0 Its use presupposes,
therefore, no physical appropriation of property by the government for
a public purpose. This fact alone militates against the use of the de-
gree test by itself in mandatory dedication situations. Since neither the
physical acquisition ,test nor the degree test per se have been utilized
in defining a constitutional standard of reasonableness, the question re-
mains: what standard of reasonableness has been adopted?
In Associated, the plaintiff claimed that the exactions pursuant to sec-
tion 11546 would be constitutionally justified only if (1) the need for
the recreational land to be dedicated could be attributed to the new
subdivision alone, 51 and (2) the subdivider's contribution would neces-
sarily and primarily benefit the particular subdivision. 2  The Asso-
ciated court, noting its prior decision in Ayres v. City Council of Los
Angeles63 rejected plaintiff's contentions:
We held [in Ayres] . . . that the conditions were not improper because
their fulfillment would incidentally benefit the city as a whole or be-
cause future as well as immediate needs were taken into consideration
and that potential as well as present population factors affecting the
neighborhood could be considered in formulating the conditions im-
posed upon the subdivider. We do not find in Ayres support for the
principle urged by Associated that a dedication requirement may be
upheld only if the particular subdivision creates the need for the dedi-
cation.5 4
Thus, in holding section 11546 to be a reasonable exercise of this
48. See text accompanying notes 28-39 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 69, 125-29 infra.
50. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra.
51. 4 Cal. 3d at 637, 484 P.2d 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
52. Id. at 640, 484 P.2d at 611-12, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
53. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
54. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
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state's police power, the court in Associated5 accorded substantial
weight to Ayres,56 a leading case in the area of mandatory dedications."
Ayres, however, has never been afforded a consistent interpretation.
Some courts have construed Ayres as mandating a narrow standard of
reasonableness,"s while others see that decision as authority for a
broader view of the state's power.5" Associated relied upon Ayres for
this more permissive view. But the court in Associated, seemingly dis-
satisfied with sole reliance on Ayres, went further and prophetically an-
nounced a new standard of reasonableness in the area of compulsory
dedications-a standard which has resulted in the broadest view to date
of the state's police power.60 Why the court offered this new approach
to mandatory dedications when unnecessary to its decision 6 is not clear.
However, the ambiguity of the Ayres opinion and the confusion it has
engendered throughout the country certainly suggests the desirability of
a new and clearer approach.
In Ayres, the City of Los Angeles imposed, as a condition to the
approval of the plaintiff's proposed 13-acre subdivision, a requirement
that the subdivider: (1) dedicate a 10-foot strip abutting Sepulveda
Boulevard (a major thoroughfare) running along the eastern bound-
ary of the subdivision for the purpose of widening Sepulveda, (2) restrict
an additional 10-foot strip along Sepulveda for the planting of trees and
shrubbery which would prevent direct ingress and egress to the sub-
division from Sepulveda, and (3) dedicate an 80-foot wide extension of
a street which was to enter the subdivision from the west.62  Despite
55. Id.
56. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
57. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 41, at 1132.
58. See text accompanying notes 100-103 infra. This narrow standard of reasonable-
ness requires the government entity demanding the exactions to make a dual showing
concerning the reasonableness of the compelled exactions. First, it must show a
"reasonable relationship" between the needs generated by the owner's proposed use of
his property and the exactions required. Second, the government must demonstrate that
some economic benefit to the property owner would result from the compelled exac-
tions themselves.
59. See text accompanying notes 80-99 infra. Generally, this broader view of the
police power necessitates only that the government entity compelling the exactions
show a "reasonable relationship" between those exactions and the needs generated by
the owner's proposed use of his property.
60. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634, wherein the court
opined:
Even if it were not for the authority of Ayres we would have no doubt that sec-
tion 11546 can be justified on the basis of general public need. . . . (emphasis
added)
For a discussion of this expansive new concept see text accompanying notes 139-144
infra.
61. Id.; see text accompanying notes 139-144 infra.
62. 34 Cal. 2d at 34, 207 P.2d at 3.
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the subdivider's claim that the city should be acting under its eminent
domain power, the court found the exactions to be a constitutional exer-
cise of the city's police power. In so holding, the court reasoned that
since the subdivider was seeking to acquire the advantages of lot sub-
divisions,
upon him rests the duty of compliance with reasonable conditions for
design, dedication, improvement and restrictive use of the land so as to
conform to the safety and general welfare of the lot owners in the sub-
division and of the public.A3
Accordingly, the subdivider was deprived of a compensation award
for his "taken" property. As to the precise meaning of the term "rea-
sonable conditions" the court was silent, though it did opine that "[qlues-
tions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact." 4 It
might be inferred from this that the question of reasonableness de-
pends upon, and should be limited to, the particular facts and circum-
stances of each case. Thus, while the Ayres court afforded no spe-
cific definition of "reasonable", some insight into the meaning of the
term may be seen by examining the factual circumstances of that case.
Two principal considerations led the court to its holding. First, at
least some of the need for the exactions was attributable to the pro-
posed subdivision itself.65 Second, the court found that the subdivi-
sion design required by the city had economically benefited the sub-
divider in such a manner that the imposed exactions would not be
financially detrimental to him.66
With respect to the need attributable to the subdivision, the city
showed that the new subdivision residents would generate increased
traffic flow necessitating wider streets, and that the planting strip would
insure conformance of the proposed subdivision to the prevailing de-
sign pattern of the neighborhood. 67  The court noted, however, that
"[plotential as well as present population factors affecting the sub-
division and the neighborhood generally are appropriate for consid-
eration." 68  The court failed to state precisely how much of the need
must be attributable to the subdivision in particular as opposed to that
amount attributable to the neighborhood generally. Thus, the degree
63. Id. at 42, 207 P.2d at 7 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 41, 207 P.2d at 7.
65. Id. at 38-39, 207 P.2d at 5-6.
66. Id. at 40-41, 207 P.2d at 6-7.
67. Id. at 38-39, 42, 207 P.2d at 5, 8.
68. Id. at 41, 207 P.2d at 7 (emphasis added). As will be seen later, this point
is crucial in the Associated court's holding.
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of relationship between needs generated by the new subdivision itself
and the exactions demanded by the city was left obscure. Later cases
interpreted the Ayres "need" test to mean everything from needs shown
to be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the proposed subdivi-
sion"0 to needs which were related to the proposed subdivision only by
general legislative fiat.7" Under the former test, which is a questionable
interpretation of Ayres, a city would be required to make an evidentiary
showing that the new subdivision had imposed specific burdens on the
community which it would then be expected to correct. Under the lat-
ter test, the entry of a new subdivision as a matter of law would impose
particular burdens on the community as specified in the legislation and
the city would not be required to show that certain specific needs were
caused by the subdivision's creation. Despite the court's lack of clarity
on the subject, some commentators have interpreted the Ayres need
principle to require a "reasonable relationship" between the dedication
imposed and the increased traffic and other needs of the proposed
subdivision.71 Applying this interpretation of Ayres, these commen-
tators have concluded it to be the primary basis of the Ayres holding.
72
Yet, the term "reasonable relationship" is a conveniently vague phrase
which fails to describe the extent to which present and future general
neighborhood needs may be considered when imposing "reasonable
conditions" on a subdivider. The court did not resolve this issue.
However, in view of the fact that the court considered present gen-
erated need as well as future neighborhood needs, the only proper mean-
ing which can be attached to the Ayres need test is that at least some, but
not all, of the needs for which exactions are imposed on the subdivider
must be traceable to the new subdivision.
The subdivider in Ayres had suffered no financial loss and had ac-
tually economically benefited from the exactions imposed. This fact
69. See, e.g., Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 453, 167 N.E.2d
230, 234 (1960); Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22
Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799, 801-02 (1961). See text accompanying notes 126-127
infra.
70. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 35, 394 P.2d 182,
188 (1964).
71. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 41, at 1132-33. As used by these commentators,
the meaning of the term "reasonable relationship" appears to be very close to that of
the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test. However, this formulation of the
Ayres need test appears to ignore the court's earlier statement:
Nor is it a valid objection to say that the conditions contemplate future as well as
more immediate needs. Potential as well as present population factors affecting
the subdivision and the neighborhood generally are appropriate for consideration.
34 Cal. 2d at 41, 207 P.2d at 7 (emphasis added).
72. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 41, at 1132-33.
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supplied the second basis of the court's holding.73 The city-required
"cellular" subdivision design 74 was found to have reduced the total
amount of land which the subdivider would have had to dedicate under
a regular subdivision design. 75 Implicitly applying a set-off principle,
the court found that when the subdivider asked to be compensated for
his dedicated land, he was in fact requesting compensation in addition
to those savings wrought by the cellular design required for the subdi-
vision.76 One commentator has suggested that this lack of detriment to
the subdivider was the very basis for the court's finding that the regula-
tions imposed were reasonable. 7
Although the commentators differ concerning the true basis of the
Ayres court's holding, and the court itself is vague about its definition
and tests for reasonable exactions, it could be argued that since it
placed so much emphasis on the factual setting the court intended its
need and economic benefit arguments to be limited to the facts of the
case. So limited, the court's finding that reasonable conditions were
imposed under the state's police power can be justified. If a subdivider
creates a need for streets and then actually gains by the city's method
of satisfying the need, he cannot complain that anything has been
taken from him. Streets are an obvious necessity for access to subdi-
vision homes. Thus, despite the Ayres court's adverse ruling to the
particular subdivider, he did not suffer any significant detriment be-
cause of the dedication requirement.
The Ayres decision, however, has not been limited to its peculiar
facts by subsequent California decisions. The need and benefit argu-
ments, as utilized by the Ayres court to determine when conditions
imposed on subdividers were reasonable, have been selectively incor-
porated by the California courts into opinions either supporting or
73. 34 Cal. 2d at 40-41, 207 P.2d at 6-7.
74. The court does not explain the term but it apparently refers to a design in
which not all streets within the subdivision connect with streets outside the subdivision.
Thus, there are a limited number of streets by which access may be gained to the sub-
division when compared to a subdivision of "regular" design.
75. 34 Cal. 2d at 40, 207 P.2d at 6-7. The subdivider had to provide streets
within his subdivision for access to the homes he was to build. He was no doubt more
than willing to dedicate such streets to public use in order to relieve himself of their
maintenance. He objected primarily to the widening of a street outside his subdivi-
sion. But because of the "cellular" design of the subdivision, the court found that the
amount of the required street dedications was less than the subdivider would have had
to dedicate under a "regular" subdivision design.
76. 34 Cal. 2d at 40, 207 P.2d at 7.
77. Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a
Rationale, 52 CORNEnL L.Q. 871, 892 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Johnston].
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rejecting the exercise of the police power. Some later courts have used
both arguments. 7 All later courts have at least required that the Ayres
need test be met.70  Hence, while an expansive police power has been
enunciated in most California decisions, the exact basis has remained
unclear, perhaps due to the vagueness of the Ayres decision itself.
Those courts which have required only satisfaction of the Ayres need
test have also advanced various interpretations of it. For example, in
Bringle v. Board of Supervisors,"0 the plaintiff, in return for the grant-
ing of a five year extension to his zoning variance, was required to
dedicate an easement to the county for widening of the street fronting
plaintiffs property. The California Supreme Court upheld the man-
datory dedication and cited Ayres for the proposition that a dedication
for street widening, "where reasonably related to the increased traffic
and other needs of the proposed subdivision, does not constitute a tak-
ing of private property without compensation."'" The court concluded
that, in the absence of any showing to the contrary by the plaintiff, the
board's determination that street widening was reasonably related to the
needs generated by plaintiffs excavating business must be upheld.
2
It is significant that the Bringle court was presented with no record of
the proceedings held before the county planning commission and there-
fore possessed no record of the evidence presented by the county in
support of its claim that plaintiffs activities would necessitate the pro-
posed street widening.8" The court simply implemented the legal pre-
sumption that the county's showing before the commission was adequate
and, because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence manifesting a clear
abuse of discretion, the presumption was conclusive.84  The court thus
considerably lightened the defendant's burden of showing a reasonable
78. See, e.g., Sommers v. City of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 523 (1967).
79. See Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr.
493 (1960); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 872 (1969); Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal.
App. 2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967); Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631,
318 P.2d 561 (1957).
80. 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1960).
81. Id. at 89, 351 P.2d at 767, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
82. Id. at 89-90, 351 P.2d at 767, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
83. Id. at 88, 351 P.2d at 766, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
84. Id. at 89, 351 P.2d at 767, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 495. The court stated:
Where an authorized board grants a variance it will be presumed that official duty
was performed and that the existence of the necessary facts was found, and the
board's action will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse
of discretion. Id., citing CAL. CODE OF Crv. PRoc. § 1963(15), now CAL. EviD.
CODE § 664 (West 1968).
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relationship between the plaintiffs activities and the needs flowing
therefrom. The Ayres need requirement had apparently been ener-
vated with the advantage clearly moving toward the governmental entity
compelling an exaction.
However, in Kelber v. City of Upland,5 the city had required by or-
dinance that subdividers contribute a flat rate of $30.00 per lot for a
"Park and School Site Fund" and $99.07 per acre for a "Subdivision
Drainage Fund. The funds were to be used to meet the future needs
of the entire city for park and school sites and drainage facilities. 80
In unanimously holding the ordinance ultra vires the Subdivision Map
Act, the court of appeal stated:
[T]his fund raising method is not related to the needs of this particular
subdivision . . . [and] it is not reasonably required by the type and
use of the subdivision as related to the character of local and neighbor-
hood planning and traffic conditions .... 87
Thus, the court found unacceptable the city's failure to relate par-
ticular needs of a subdivision to the fees charged the subdivider. While
not a constitutional decision, Kelber is significant for its narrow inter-
pretation of the Ayres need test.
In Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Manufacturing v. County of San Joa-
quin,8 8 Mid-Way sought a building permit from the county to enlarge
its cabinet shop. 9 As a condition precedent to granting the permit, the
county required Mid-Way to convey without compensation certain ac-
cess fights and land for a "return road" to a future expressway.00 These
requirements were based upon evidence presented by the county pur-
porting to show increased traffic burdens on streets fronting the plain-
tiffs property. 91 Examining this evidence the court of appeal found
not the slightest hint that there would be an appreciable increase in traf-
fic. On the contrary, other than an inconsequential increase of truck
deliveries from a possibly expanded cabinet shop output there will be
no effect at all.92
In disallowing the mandatory dedication, the court ruled: "Justification
of conditions depends upon there being some real relationship between
85. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
86. Id. at 633, 638, 318 P.2d at 562, 565.
87. Id. at 638, 318 P.2d at 565.
88. 257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967).
89. Id. at 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
90. Id. at 183-84, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
91. Id. at 184-85, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
92. Id. at 185, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
[Vol. 5
NOTES
the thing wanted by the landowner from government and the quid pro
quo exacted by government therefor."
93
In Scrutton v. County of Sacramento,94 the plaintiff property owner
sought to have her property rezoned from agricultural to multiple fam-
ily residential use for the purpose of developing apartment units.95 The
planning commission recommended approval of the rezoning subject to
the condition that plaintiff dedicate certain land to widen streets abutting
her property and improve them at her own expense, including pavement,
sidewalks, curbs and gutters.96 In rejecting these conditions the
court cited Ayres for the proposition that such conditions can be valid
"if reasonably conceived to fulfill public needs emanating from the
landowner's proposed use."'97 The court found that instead of showing
such generated need, the county had merely attempted to demonstrate
that the dedications would benefit the plaintiff's proposed apartments.9"
It is true that some of the courts have justified the exaction not only
for its fulfillment of public needs caused by the proposed development,
but also because it would benefit the landowner financially. Standing
alone, the landowner's economic benefit supplies inadequate underpin-
ning for the exaction. The police power forms the exaction's constitu-
tional foundation. That power is aimed at public need, not private
profit.9
9
While the Bringle, Mid-Way Cabinet, and Scrutton courts relied upon
the Ayres need test singularly to provide a sufficient measure for the
constitutionality of mandatory dedications, the court in Sommers v.
City of Los Angeles'00 utilized both the Ayres need and economic bene-
fit arguments in its constitutional analysis.
In Sommers the plaintiff sought a building permit to remodel his gas
station and enlarge its parking space.' 0 ' As a condition to its granting
the permit, the city required Sommers to dedicate some of his land for
widening of the streets abutting his station. 102 In upholding the ded-
ication, the court found that (1) the dedication bore a reasonable re-
lationship to the increased vehicular traffic generated by the enlarged
93. Id. at 192, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (emphasis added).
94. 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
95. Id. at 415, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 421, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
98. Id. at 422, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 62 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1967).
101. Id. at 606-07, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 525.
102. Id. at 608, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
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service station, and (2) the extra street width itself would benefit the
gas station by improving ingress and egress thereto and that streets
improved to their ultimate width generally increased the value of ad-
jacent property.'
03
It should be noted that this kind of economic benefit is different
from the general benefit which any property owner seeks to gain from
governmental approval of a proposed use for his property. While the
courts have actually discussed two kinds of economic benefit to the
property owner, apparently none have noted the distinction between
the two. One type of benefit may be termed "general economic bene-
fit." This is the benefit which the property owner seeks to acquire
from the proposed improvement for which he must obtain governmen-
tal approval. The second type of benefit may be called "specific eco-
nomic benefit" and consists of an economic advantage flowing from
the imposed exaction itself.
Both types of benefit were present in the Ayres case. There, the
court impliedly recognized that advantages would accrue to the sub-
divider from the mere act of subdivision itself.10 4  Presumably, the
court was referring to the fact that land values generally increase upon
subdivision and building thereon. This is a form of general economic
benefit which accrues to the property owner upon the subdivision of his
land. However, the court also found additional economic benefit to
the subdivider which resulted from the nature of the required dedica-
tions. 0 5 This specific economic benefit consisted of the savings which
resulted from the cellular design of the subdivision.'10  Such a design,
with its limited ingress and egress features, required less land to be
dedicated for street purposes than would a regular subdivision design.1
0 7
But this cellular subdivision design was possible only if the subdivider
made the kinds of dedications imposed by the city.' 08 In other words,
the required dedications made possible the cellular design which in turn
saved the subdivider money. Thus, the dedications themselves resulted
in specific economic benefit to the subdivider. It is this specific eco-
103. Id. at 618-19, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
104. 34 Cal. 2d at 42, 207 P.2d at 7.
105. Id. at 40-41, 207 P.2d at 6-7.
106. Id.
107. Id. This, of course, assumes that the subdivider recognized (as did the Ayres
subdivider) that his dedication of some land for streets would be required in any case.
The Ayres subdivider only contested the size and location of the required dedications,
not the fact that streets were required for his subdivision and that dedications were
necessary therefor.
108. Id. at 40, 207 P.2d at 6-7.
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nomic benefit which the Ayres court appeared to emphasize in its hold-
ing.
Later cases, however, with the exception of Sommers, thought it
unnecessary to find any such specific economic benefit derived from
the nature of the dedications themselves. In Bringle,10 9 the plaintiff
implicitly would have benefited if the zoning variance extension he re-
quested had been granted him.-' The variance would have permitted
the plaintiff to continue his excavating business on land zoned for ag-
riculture 11' and would have afforded him a general economic benefit
flowing from the use of his land. However, no mention was made by
the court of any specific economic benefit resulting from the proposed
street widening for which his dedication was required.
Similarly, in Southern Pacific Co. v. City of Los Angeles,"' the
Court of Appeal upheld the city's requirement of a street-widening
dedication as a condition to approval of the plaintiff's request to build
a warehouse fronting the street to be widened."' The court, using
the general economic benefit principle of Bringle, stated:
If [the builder] desires the benefits resulting from the improvement or
change in the character of the land, it must meet any reasonable condi-
tion imposed by respondents before the issuance of a building permit-
such undoubtedly is the holding in Ayres .... 114
Yet, no benefit accruing from the dedication itself is mentioned by the
court. If the court had truly followed Ayres, the city would have been
required to show some additional special economic benefit to the plain-
tiff which would result from the widened street rather than the mere
general economic benefit resulting from approval of plaintiff's pro-
posed use of his land." 5
The Ayres-engendered confusion regarding the precise test with
which to determine a reasonable regulation under the police power and
the proper weight to be afforded the need and benefit arguments used
in that case unfortunately is not clarified by the Associated decision.
There, the court failed to discuss the special economic benefit argu-
ment as used in Ayres." 6 Perhaps this was due to the narrow man-
109. 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1960).
110. Id. at 87-88, 351 P.2d at 766, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
111. Id.
112. 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966).
113. Id. at 40-41, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98.
114. Id. at 47, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 202 (emphasis added).
115. See text accompanying notes 73-77 and 104-108 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
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ner in which plaintiff Associated framed its benefit test: "[T]he sub-
divider cannot be compelled to dedicate lands . . . or pay a fee, un-
less his contribution will necessarily and primarily benefit the particular
subdivision. 1 17  Benefit here refers to the question of who will use the
ledicated land. 18 To apply the benefit argument as the Ayres court
used the term, the Associated court would have had to find some specific
economic benefit to the subdivider which accrued from the imposed ex-
actions themselves. 1 ' If, for example, the park or recreational land in
or near the subdivision resulting from the required dedications (or fees)
increased the value of the lots therein, the Ayres special economic benefit
test would be satisfied. While an argument could be made which re-
lates the beneficial use of a nearby park to increased property values
for the subdivision it primarily serves, the Associated court failed to
advance any such rationale. By discussing benefit only in the context
of who will get primary use from the required exactions, the court
avoided any discussion of the benefit test as formulated in Ayres.
Left with this different type of benefit test, the court easily an-
swered the plaintiffs contention 20 by pointing to sections 11546(c)
and (e) of the Business and Professions Code.' 2 ' These provide that
the fees or land dedicated are to be used to serve the subdivision and
that the amount and location of land dedicated and fees paid shall bear
a reasonable relationship to the use of facilities by the subdivision's fu-
ture residents.' 2 2 The court then added: "Whether or not such a direct
connection is required by constitutional considerations, section 11546
provides the nexus which concerns Associated.'
23
If the benefit nexus, as that term is used by the Associated court, is
not constitutionally required for a valid exercise of the police power,
perhaps the court is presaging the possible abandonment of any bene-
fit test in the future. That this is a distinct possibility is evidenced by
the close relationship between the benefit principle used by Associated
and its apparent adoption of the broad interpretation of the Ayres need
test.'24 In other words, it seems only fair that if the need for recrea-
117. 4 Cal. 3d at 640, 484 P.2d at 611-12, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
118. Id. at 640 n.5, 484 P.2d at 612 n.5, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.5.
119. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
121. 4 Cal. 3d at 636, 484 P.2d at 609, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 633, citing CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE ANN. §§ 11546(c), (e) (West Supp. 1971) [supra note 3].
122. Id.
123. 4 Cal. 3d at 640, 484 P.2d at 612, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
124. Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
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tional land develops primarily from the influx of new residents and they
pay for that need, they ought to derive primary benefit from the use of
the new facilities. Accordingly, as the nexus between the required dedi-
cation and the need generated by the new subdivision becomes clearer
in any given case, the benefit which would accrue from that dedication
to the subdivision should become correspondingly greater.
The plaintiff in Associated argued that compulsory dedications could
be constitutionally justified only if the need for them were directly
tied to the increase in population generated by the subdivision alone
and not to the general growth of the community as a whole. " 5 This
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test of generated need was up-
held in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Pros-
pect. 26 The Associated court, however, citing Ayres, rejected this
approach. Justice Mosk did not find in Ayres "support for the prin-
ciple urged by Associated that a dedication requirement may be up-
held only if the particular subdivision creates the need for dedica-
tion,"'1 7 and thus adopted the need test enunciated in Ayres.128  It
follows that if dedications can be required which consider general com-
munity needs as well as needs generated by the new subdivision in ques-
tion, then the public at large can receive corresponding benefit from the
dedication. And if the Ayres need test presents no constitutional prob-
lems to the court, then the principle of primary benefit to subdivision
residents, as urged by Associated, may not be constitutionally required
either.' 19
Additionally, in dictum, the court found merit in the position offered
by the Sierra Club as amicus curiae. Sierra contended that the dedica-
tions and fee exactions may validly be employed to provide facilities for
the general public rather than for the benefit of the new subdivision.' 30
125. Id. at 637-38, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
126. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 377, 176 N.E.2d 799, 801 (1961). The court there erroneously
cited Ayres in support of its "specifically and uniquely attributable" test. Nevertheless,
the test seems to more adequately solve the constitutional issues than Ayres (i.e. there
can be no taking if the subdivider is required to satisfy only the needs he creates)
and has been cited approvingly by commentators. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note
41, at 1141-142. (It is there suggested that modem cost accounting techniques be used
to determine exactly what needs can be specifically attributed to the subdivider).
127. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634. Ayres did not
specify precisely how much need must be shown to be generated by the new subdivision
as opposed to general community needs.
128. See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
129. This follows from the above stated close relationship between the "need" and
"benefit" arguments as used by the Associated court.
130. 4 Cal. 3d at 640-41 n.6, 484 P.2d at 612 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.6.
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The court noted two factors in support of this position: (1) the in-
creasing mobility of the population (thus enabling subdivision resi-
dents to use the facilities even though not conveniently located to the
subdivision), and (2) the great need for recreational facilities in Cali-
fornia.131 The court stated, for example, that a subdivider who for-
tuitously developed land close to an already established park adequate
to meet the needs of its residents, could reasonably have his fees used
to develop recreational facilities in another part of town in order "to
maintain the proper balance between the number of persons in the
community and the amount of park land available.
132
The Associated court had at this point adopted only the Ayres need
rationale as the basis for its holding.1 33  It had cast doubt upon the
constitutional necessity of the benefit principle advanced by Associ-
ated,134 and had implicitly dismissed the specific economic benefit test
of Ayres..
3 5
The apparent rejection of the Ayres test can be justified in light of
that court's failure to distinguish properly between the police power and
the power of eminent domain. The specific infirmity consisted of the
suggestion in Ayres that economic benefit to the subdivider from ex-
actions required of him could be setoff against the value of the land
taken and could thereby operate in lieu of compensation.' 80 This is
clearly incorrect since the concept of compensation is alien and irrele-
vant to an exercise of the police power.'3 The idea of a setoff princi-
ple operating as a form of compensation must also be alien since once
it is determined that the state is exercising its police power, the property
owner is entitled neither to compensation nor, logically, to anything in
lieu of compensation.' 38  This theoretical blurring of the police power
vis-t-vis the power of eminent domain is further evidenced by the fact
131. Id.
132. Id. In support of this proposition the court cites Southern Pac. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966). It is difficult to see
how this case supports the court's dictum. In Southern Pacific, the land required
from the plaintiff as a condition to the city's approval of his warehouse construction
fronted the plaintiff's property. Further, much emphasis was given to the fact that
the need for the widened street would be generated mostly from the increased traffic
on the fronting street resulting from the plaintiff's warehouse activities.
133. See text accompanying notes 67-72 and 126-27 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 122-31 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 115-18 supra.
136. See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 40-41, 207 P.2d 1,
6-7 (1949). See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
137. NicHoLs, supra note 16 § 1.42; Note, 20 HAST. LJ. 735, 743 (1969).
138. 14,
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that in both the Ayres and the Mid-Way Cabinet cases the govern-
ment contemplated condemning the very land it later "took" under the
police power when the property owner was forced to seek local govern-
mental approval.13 9
However, in addition to moving away from the various benefit tests,
the Associated court also signaled a possible departure from the Ayres
need test and the substitution of a far more permissive standard in its
stead. Justice Mosk, after utilizing Ayres to reject the specifically and
uniquely attributable test advanced by Associated, noted in dictum:
"Even if it were not for the authority of Ayres we would have no doubt
that section 11546 can be justified on the basis of a general public need
for recreational facilities caused by present and future subdivisions. 1 40
The court realized that such need is created by the combined pressures
of population growth 1' and the disappearance of open land in Cali-
fornia.
142
Apparently, the court is suggesting that general public need can be
the future test of a reasonable exercise of the police power. Yet, be-
cause public need is also required for an exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain, 43 it alone cannot be the distinguishing factor between
the two. Further, if public need were indeed the test, by what means
could sufficient public need be measured so as to justify an exercise of
the police power?
In presaging the possible abandonment of any benefit or need test
other than a general public need requirement, the Associated court's
dictum raises serious questions regarding future limitations of the po-
lice power in mandatory dedication situations. In such situations, the
property owner requires some kind of approval from the government for
a proposed improvement to his property in return for which the gov-
ernment attaches conditions requiring dedications or fees. If the gov-
ernment must demonstrate only a "general public need" and is not re-
quired to show either the precise burdens imposed by the property
owner upon the community or the lack of a substantial burden upon the
property owner himself, the future of the police power in California
139. See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 40, 207 P.2d 1, 6
(1949); Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal. App. 2d
181, 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37, 38 (1967).
140. 4 Cal. 3d at 368, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (emphasis added).
141. The population of Walnut Creek increased from 9903 in 1960 to 36,606 in
1970. 4 Cal. 3d at 639, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
142. 4 Cal. 3d at 639, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
143. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
19723
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
seems virtually unlimited. So long as the property owner properly
requests governmental approval, the decision whether or not to pay com-
pensation for a contemplated public improvement rests entirely within
the government's discretion. In the unlikely event that the government
chooses to pay for the land which the public improvement requires, it
may do so under its power of eminent domain. If it chooses not to
pay, it may simply act under the Associated court's expansive notion
of the police power, citing the "general public need" for the land in
question.
The court's actual holding, however, raises additional questions
worth noting. In declaring that present and potential population fac-
tors which generally affect the neighborhood may be considered in
mandatory dedication situations,'144 the Associated court relied upon a
mere conclusional statement in Ayres145 and failed to support its re-
statement of that conclusion. 4 6 Further, the court failed to afford any
reasons for its rejection of the Pioneer Trust "specifically and uniquely
attributable" test.
147
This summary disposition of the "created need" issue raises problems
to which the court does not address itself. For instance, the precise
justification for imposing costs upon new subdivision residents other
than those which they create by their entrance into the community is
still lacking definition. 48  The imposition upon the subdivider of some
costs which were created by the general growth of the city as a whole
144. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
145. In fact, the Ayres court seemed to come to exactly the opposite conclusion
that it logically should have, judging from its earlier statements. It stated: "Questions
of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact. They are not abstract
ideas or theories. In a growing metropolitan area each additional subdivision adds
to the traffic burden." 34 Cal. 2d at 41, 207 P.2d at 7. One might logically expect
the court to conclude: Therefore, each subdivision should "pay for" its addition to the
traffic burden. However, the court actually concludes:
Nor is it a valid objection to say that the conditions contemplate future as well
as more immediate needs. Potential as well as present population factors affecting
the subdivision and the neighborhood generally are appropriate for consideration.
Id.
146. The court only criticizes the Pioneer Trust "specifically and uniquely at-
tributable" test by noting that court's misinterpretation of Ayres. 4 Cal. 3d at 644
n.13, 484 P.2d at 615 n.13, 94 Cal. Rptr. 639 n.13. See note 126 supra.
147. At least one other court has given qualified support to the Pioneer Trust inter-
pretation. In Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
(1965), the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the Pioneer Trust analysis of Ayres
as long as it was not applied so as to cause an unreasonable burden of proof upon the
municipality concerned. See generally Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 41.
148. This assumes the subdivider's cost of dedication or fees is passed on to the new
subdivision resident in the form of higher prices.
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and not specifically attributable to the new subdivision was arguably
more justified in Ayres where the subdivision residents were minimally
burdened by the dedications imposed by the city.149 However, no simi-
lar offsetting benefit accrued to the new subdivisions residents in As-
sociated.
A possible rationale is suggested in a recent law review article,
wherein the author views the subdivider as a "manufacturer, proces-
sor, and marketer of a product,"'15 and notes that "subdivision control
exactions are actually business regulations."' 5 ' The subdivider is con-
sidered a transient owner who is seeking merely to maximize his profits
and who can usually pass the exactions imposed upon him to future
home buyers in his subdivision.'52 Thus, the subdivider suffers from
the exactions only because his homes may be slightly higher priced than
those in a jurisdiction where such exactions are not imposed. Asso-
ciated proffered an example of such additional cost,'5 s indicating
that under the Walnut Creek formula the addition to the price of each
new home brought about by the imposed exactions would amount to
only $200.1"4 Further, under this rationale, just as a subdivider fails
to lose anything other than a form of business tax,' 55 so also do the new
149. But see note 75 supra.
150. Johnston, supra note 77, at 923.
151. Id. The basis of the author's comment is Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), where it is suggested that the equali-
zation fees imposed upon subdividers who did not dedicate land under a statutory
scheme similar to California's were in the nature of an excise rather than property tax.
152. See 4 Cal. 3d at 648, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
153. The example provided was used in another context by plaintiff, but illustrates
the additional costs involved: A subdivider owning 25 acres of land valued at $20,000
per acre who divided the land into 100 quarter-acre lots for sale as single family
dwellings would be required to dedicate land or pay fees equivalent to $20,000 under the
Walnut Creek formula. Since each new residence is assumed to consist of four people,
the subdivider is held responsible for having brought 400 people into the community.
Under the formula of 2.5 acres dedicated per 1000 new residents, the subdivider
would have to dedicate 1 acre (or pay its value, $20,000, in fees to the city). This
amounts to an additional $200 cost for each new home. See 4 Cal. 3d at 645 n.14,
484 P.2d at 616 n.14, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640 n.14.
154. Id.
155. On the issue of taxation, Associated raised two rather peripheral arguments.
First, it claimed "double taxation" on the property of future residents of the subdivision
since they must not only carry the initial burden of financing their park but must also
pay property taxes for its development and maintenance. 4 Cal. 3d at 642, 484 P.2d
at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637. Disregarding the issue of whether Associated even had
standing to raise such an issue since the detriment would be suffered by the future
property taxpayers and not Associated, the court noted that double taxation occurs only
when "two taxes of the same character are imposed on the same property, for the same
purpose, by the same taxing authority within the same jurisdiction during the same
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subdivision residents fail to lose anything substantial. For while they
might pay more for their homes, they are no more adversely affected
than would be any consumer doing business in a jurisdiction with a
business tax structure that happens to affect the property he consumes.
Finally, the strong policy in favor of preservation of valuable land re-
sources is promoted by such mandatory dedications, thus maintaining
the long-term property values of the municipality and discouraging the
growth of slum-prone, concrete jungles."" However, while this ex-
planation offers an excellent rationale for the court's holding, it too of-
fers no analytical test for determining the precise point at which com-
pensation must be given by the state.
An additionally perplexing aspect of the instant decision is the court's
failure to adequately discuss the many contentions which specifically al-
leged equal protection violations' 57 or should have been treated as
such.' 5" The traditional test of Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion' 59 requires: (1) that any classification of a group of individuals
under a state law must serve to foster a legitimate state purpose, and
(2) that there must exist a rational relationship of the classification to
the achievement of that purpose.' 60 The traditional standard for equal
protection to which California also adheres,' 0 ' allows the states
a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of
citizens differently than others. . . . State legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimina-
taxing period." Id. Associated's claim did not meet this definition and was properly
dismissed by the court.
A second, related argument advanced by Associated was that the exactions con-
stituted a special assessment against the future subdivision property owners without right
of hearing or protest. 4 Cal. 3d at 642 n.10, 484 P.2d at 614 n.10, 94 Cal. Rptr. at
638 n.10. Given the court's previous rejection of a strict relationship between benefits
flowing to a subdivision's residents and the exactions imposed upon it, the court un-
derstandably rejects this argument since just such a strict relationship is required in a
special assessment situation. 14 McQumLN, supra note 15, § 38.02.
156. See Johnston, supra note 77, at 923.
157. 4 Cal. 3d at 637, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
158. 4 Cal. 3d at 642-43, 648, 484 P.2d at 614, 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638, 642.
159. There is also a "new" concept of equal protection in which a "stricter scrutiny"
standard is applied in cases where a law infringes upon "fundamental interests" or
creates "suspect classifications." See note 176 infra. There is no indication in the
Associated case that the court applied anything other than the traditional concept
of equal protection.
160. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
161. See, e.g., Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 20 Cal. 2d
684, 128 P.2d 529 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 759 (1943); People v. Gidaly, 35
Cal. App. 2d (Supp.) 758, 93 P.2d 660 (1939).
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tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it.10
2
It is under this permissive canopy that the two-pronged equal protec-
tion requirements must be found.
The Associated court found a legitimate state purpose. to be reflected
in "the recent adoption of article XXVIII of the [California] Constitu-
tion, which provides that it is in the best interests of the state to main-
tain and preserve open space lands. .. ., The legislative history
of section 11546 revealed that passage of the section was based upon an
abiding concern over the disappearance of open space in California,'0
and, while this issue was left unmentioned by the court, it would appear
that the elevation to constitutional status of open space preservation is
in itself sufficient evidence of a legitimate state interest underlying the
enactment of section 11546.
The second equal protection requirement, that the established classi-
fication be rationally related to the purpose sought to be achieved,1 65
introduces several important issues into the discussion. An initial ques-
tion is whether the class of Walnut Creek developers seeking to subdi-
vide, and thus subject to exactions under the local ordinance, is denied
equal protection on the basis of a statute which is under-inclusive,
and hence without rational basis, since excluded from its ambit are
developers who are either subdividers in municipalities without exaction
requirements or non-sub dividers (e.g., apartment builders).
The court failed to discuss whether the ordinance discriminated in
favor of non-Walnut Creek developers. Several factors, however, mili-
tate against the finding of such an equal protection violation. First,
the permissive standards of the traditional equal protection test make
it difficult to prove equal protection violations since some reasonable
basis for a classification can usually be unearthed.V 166 Second, if the
Walnut Creek exactions are deemed a form of business regulation, their
invalidation under traditional equal protection standards is unlikely in
view of the United States Supreme Court's general tendency to sustain
economic regulations which have been attacked on equal protection
162. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961), citing Kotch v. Board
of River Port Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell,
294 U.S. 580 (1935).
163. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
164. Id. at 639, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
165. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
166. See cases cited in note 162 supra.
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grounds.' 7  Third, as has already been pointed out, the exactions im-
posed under the Walnut Creek formula were minimal (about a $200
addition to the price of a new house)." 8 It is improbable that a Wal-
nut Creek subdivider would be placed in a financially detrimental po-
sition in his competition with subdividers operating outside of Walnut
Creek. Moreover, a classification shown to possess some reasonable
basis does not fail under the traditional equal protection test merely be-
cause it results in some inequality. A fortiori, a subdivider typically is
in competition with other subdividers operating in the same commu-
nity, and hence a community exaction standard would work no preju-
dice on any one subdivider but rather would treat all equally. Fourth,
now that section 11546 has been found constitutional, it may be ex-
pected that additional California cities will enact under the enabling
statute mandatory dedication ordinances similar to Walnut Creek's.
Thus, as more cities enact ordinances which compel exactions from sub-
dividers, the likelihood that any one subdivider may be unfairly dis-
criminated against because he operates in a city which happens to have
such an ordinance decreases accordingly.
A more difficult issue, and one to which the court devoted some dis-
cussion, is whether the statute discriminates only against subdividers but
not against those who do not subdivide (e.g., apartment builders). In
its discussion of the issue the court conceded that the "apartment
builder, by increasing the population of an area, may add to the need
for public recreational facilities to the same extent as the subdivider."' 0 9
The court added, however, that since
the apartment is generally vertical, while the subdivision is horizontal
.. . [t]he Legislature could reasonably have assumed that an apart-
ment house is thus ordinarily constructed upon land considerably
smaller in dimension than most subdivisions and the erection of the
apartment is, therefore, not decreasing the limited supply of open
space to the same extent as the formation of a subdivision. This sig-
nificant distinction justifies legislatively treating the builder of an apart-
ment house who does not subdivide differently than the creator of a sub-
division. 17
0
The court thus expressly found a "state of facts" which could con-
ceivably justify the distinction section 11546 draws between subdivid-
ing and non-subdividing apartment builders. This finding vitiates
167. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
168. See note 153 supra.
169. 4 Cal. 3d at 643, 484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
170. Id.
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claims that section 11546's classification bears no rational relationship
to the achievement of the state's purpose in enacting it.'7 '
The effects of the required exactions upon future subdivision resi-
dents may be discriminatory. Associated raised the possibility that a city
might set dedication and fee requirements so high that the cost passed
on to the home buyers would preclude the entry into the community of
lower income family units.' 72 The court recognized the potential dan-
ger but observed:
[T]here is nothing to indicate that the enactments of Walnut Creek in
the present case raise such a spectre. The desirability of encouraging
subdividers to build low-cost housing cannot be denied and unreason-
able exactions could defeat this object, but these considerations must
be balanced against the phenomenon of the appallingly rapid disap-
pearance of open areas in and around our cities.' 73
It is difficult to take issue with this statement by the court. The ef-
fect of the Walnut Creek exactions upon the price of new homes was
mini l.174  A $200 addition to the price of a new home in Walnut
Creek would not, of itself, exclude a low-income buyer. It is more
likely that the price of the new home, excluding any mark-up for exac-
tions imposed upon the subdivider, would itself preclude the low-in-
come buyer from making a purchase. The court warned, however, that
deliberate practice of excluding low-income families through excessive
exactions from subdividers "would present serious social and legal prob-
lems." 75 This leaves open the door for the court to disallow unwar-
ranted exactions.'
76
171. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Sacramento Municipal
Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 684, 693, 128 P2.d 529, 535 (1942),
cert. denied, 318 U.S. 759 (1943).
Other rationales justifying statutory discriminations were also available to the As-
sociated court. Various approaches were discussed in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
at 426 n.3, wherein the court quoted from Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955), as follows:
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doc-
trinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or
the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the prob-
lem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select
one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The pro-
hibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious dis-
crimination.
172. 4 Cal. 3d at 648, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
173. Id.
174. See note 153 supra.
175. 4 Cal. 3d at 648, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
176. If faced with such a future deliberate policy to exclude low-income groups
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Another issue raised by the plaintiff also touches on the equal pro-
tection problem although the court did not frame its argument around
it. Under the Walnut Creek formula, a high-density developer' 77 may
be required to dedicate proportionately more land or pay more fees
than a low-density developer although each may be responsible for
from subdivisions, the court would probably apply a more critical equal protection
standard, analyzing with stricter scrutiny (i.e. "stricter" than the analysis applied to
economic regulation) any classification which is "suspect" or which touches upon a
"fundamental interest" of a citizen, and invalidating any such classification unless the
state enacting it can demonstrate that it necessarily furthers a compelling state interest.
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609
(1971).
Classifications based on race, color, or national origin have been deemed "suspect"
by the United States Supreme Court. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Classifications based on wealth are also suspect. See
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956). Because such classifications are suspect, they bear a far heavier burden of
justification. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601, 609 (1971). That is, they will be invalidated unless the state making the
classifications can show they are necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental
purpose. Id.
Thus, a future California court, analyzing a deliberate policy of exclusion of low-
income groups from subdivisions through the device of excessively high exactions im-
posed upon the subdivider, would have to balance the classification (if there is one)
based on wealth against the state's interest of preserving open land space.
Classifications affecting "fundamental interests" will also elicit stricter scrutiny
from the courts, resulting in invalidation of the classification absent the showing of
a "compelling state interest." The courts have characterized interests as funda-
mental in several areas. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)
(right to vote); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent defendant's right to free trial transcript on crim-
inal appeal); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971)
(right to education).
Whether a deliberate policy of low-income group exclusion would infringe upon any
fundamental interest remains to be seen. It is important at this point, however, to
understand the kind of balancing a future court may have to make between com-
peting, and ostensibly "good", social interests. On the one hand, the court must con-
sider the state's interest in preserving open land space. On the other, consideration
must be given to the harmful social effects of allowing a discrimination based on
wealth or one which affects a fundamental interest. Regardless of the outcome of
this balancing, such a future case is sure to spark controversy.
177. A high-density developer, as the term is apparently used by the court, is one
who subdivides into smaller parcels than the low-density developer. This results in
the introduction of more people into a community by a high-density developer than
by a low-density developer if, for example, both begin their subdivisions with tracts of
equal size. 4 Cal. 3d at 645, 484 P.2d at 615-16, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40.
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bringing an identical number of people into the city. This situation re-
sults because high-density land is usually more valuable than low-den-
sity land. 1
8
Associated, assuming as did the city of Walnut Creek that each sin-
gle-family dwelling houses four persons, presented the following hypo-
thetical. A subdivider owning 25 acres of land, valued at $20,000
per acre, divides his land into 100 single-family parcels thus adding 400
new residents. Under the Walnut Creek formula requiring 2.5 acres of
land (or its monetary equivalent) to be dedicated for each new 1,000
residents, he must dedicate one acre of land (or pay $20,000 in fees
in lieu thereof). A developer who subdivides 50 acres, each worth
$10,000, into 100 one-half acre single-family parcels would also cause
the entry of 400 new residents. However, this second developer would
be compelled to dedicate only one acre too (2% of his total acreage as
opposed to the 4% dedication required of the high-density devel-
oper) or pay only $10,000 in fees (the value of that single acre).
179
Associated contended that the hypothetical illustrated the arbitrariness of
the regulation as it is applied to the high-density developer.
The court deemed it reasonable to require a high-density developer to
dedicate more land or pay higher fees than the low-density developer
even though both had caused the entry of the same number of residents
into the community.' s0 The court believed this differentiation was per-
missible as long as there existed a "reasonable relationship between the
use of the facilities by future residents and the fee charged the subdi-
vider.'' 1 8 By assuming that high-density residents would use the pub-
lic recreational facilities more often than would lower-density residents
with larger private yards, a reasonable relationship was found."8 ' Thus,
the justification for this distinction between high and low-density de-
velopers rested upon a speculative assessment of the prospective use of
dedicated land by the subdivision's new residents.
The logic seems inconsistent with the court's earlier defense of the
legislative exclusion of non-subdividing apartment builders.8 3 The
court had argued previously that since apartments typically occupy less
land than a subdivision, they diminish the already limited supply of
potential recreational land much less consequentially than does a sub-
178. Id. at 645, 484 P.2d at 616, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
179. Id. at 645 n.14, 484 P.2d at 616 n.14, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640 n.14.
180. Id. at 645, 484 P.2d at 616, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 642-43, 484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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division.1' 4 Although reference had been made to the expanded de-
mand for recreational land which the apartment dwellers' entry into the
community would create,'8 5 the court apparently considered this insig-
nificant when compared with the amount of space the apartment de-
velopment would require. When discussing the high-density subdivider,
however, the court suddenly became concerned with the proportionately
greater demand for recreational land generated by high-density resi-
dents. Nevertheless, the court failed to recognize that a low-density de-
velopment requires more land than a high-density development-a fac-
tor which might render less efficacious the argument that a greater de-
mand for recreational land must be attributed to high-density residents.
The question arises: Was the court more concerned with the de-
mand for recreational land generated by new residents or with the
amount of land which the development would occupy? If it were the
former, high-density developers should have been compelled to dedicate
more land than low-density developers; but, if the latter was given sway,
low-density developers should have been required to dedicate more
land. The court adopted a middle ground although mouthing great
concern for "demand."
Legislative intent underlying section 11546 seems to have been con-
cerned with the demand created by new residents rather than the quan-
tity of land a residential subdivision occupies.186  This supports the
court's arguments as they relate to high-density developers but casts
doubt upon those which defend the legislature's exclusion of non-
subdividing apartment builders from section 11546. Thus, the "state
of facts" that apartments use less land than subdivisions, as found by
184. Id.
185. Id. at 643, 484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
186. The committee report concerning section 11546 found that increased population
had created the need for more neighborhood recreational space. From this it may be
inferred that the legislature was concerned with providing recreational land based on
the number of people entering the community rather than the amount of land used
by the new subdivision. 6 ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. REPORTS, FINAL REPORT OF
THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM Comm. ON MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY GOV'T 31, ch. 1809, § 3
[1965] Cal. Stat. 4183.
Additionally, section 11546(e) itself provides: 'The amount and location of land to
be dedicated or the fees to be paid shall bear a reasonable relationship to the use of
the park and recreational facilities by the future inhabitants of the subdivision."
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 11546(e) (West Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
Finally, the Walnut Creek resolution, which provided that 2.5 acres of land were to be
dedicated (or the equivalent value in fees) for each 1000 new residents entering the
community, was clearly based on an estimate of residents' use of recreational facilities
and not on the amount of land occupied by the subdivision. See text accompanying
notes 7 & 8 supra.
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the court (albeit implicitly) to support the statute's discrimination be-
tween subdividers and non-subdividing builders,18 7 appears ill-founded.
Instead legislative intent expresses a concern for providing Californians
with recreational land adequate to satisfy the needs of a burgeoning
population, 8 There is no indication that the legislature desired the
amount of land used by the development in question to be a significant
factor in determining how to satisfy those needs. 8 9 The court itself,
when dealing with the problem of discrimination between high-den-
sity and low-density subdividers, attached primary importance to the
need for recreational land rather than to the amount of land occupied
by a subdivision. 90 Hence, the ratiocination that apartments develop
"vertically while subdivisions grow horizontally" appears to supply an
inadequate basis for differentiating between the two.
A statutory discrimination may be upheld, however, under the ra-
tionale that "reform may take one step at a time."'' Although the
court's stated rationale may be wanting, the statutory discrimination
between subdividers and non-subdividing apartment builders probably
can be justified under the theory that reform, in the absence of in-
vidious discrimination, need not be accomplished all at once.' 92
It may be concluded that despite the inconsistencies in the court's
argument and reasoning, section 11546 and reasonable ordinances fol-
lowing therefrom do not violate equal protection principles. While a
municipal ordinance promulgated under the authority of section 11546
conceivably could discriminate invidiously by deliberately excluding
lower income groups from a subdivision, the Walnut Creek ordinance
clearly does not fall within this category.
A more immediate and troubling aspect of the Associated decision
is the groundwork it lays for future augmentation of the police power.
If public need for scarce land resources can justify exactions for recre-
ational purposes, the subdivider may be fair game for any governmen-
tal land need. Large land development companies, with their immense
economic resources, may be able to weather the financial storm which
undoubtedly will be unleashed by section 11546, its municipal ordi-
nance offspring and the Associated opinion. The small businessman,
landowner, or developer who must obtain governmental approval for
187. See text accompanying notes 171-72 supra.
188. See note 186 supra.
189. Id.
190. See text accompanying notes 178-84 supra.
191. See note 172 supra.
192. Id.
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a proposed improvement to his property, however, has reason to view
darkly the expanded police power in California. As the financial re-
sources of local governments decline, the legacy of Associated may well
be a corresponding expansion of the police power into areas tradition-
ally reserved for eminent domain.
Robert E. Hall
